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Research highlights 
 
 Risk exposure, temporary employment and low-skill jobs have a substantial 
positive effect on the probability of disability.  
 The presence of immigrants in the three unhealthy working conditions is 
relatively higher than that of natives. 
 Immigrants are less likely to become disabled; in part because the impact of the 
work variables is smaller in their case. 
 There are some differences among immigrants by region of origin, calling for 
caution to avoid over generalisation. 
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Spain. 
 
Abstract 
 
We analyse the impact of working and contractual conditions, particularly exposure to job 
risks, on the probability of acquiring a permanent disability, controlling for other personal and 
firm characteristics. We postulate a model in which this impact is mediated by the choice of 
occupation, with a level of risk associated with it. We assume this choice is endogenous, and 
that it depends on preferences and opportunities in the labour market, both of which may 
differ between immigrants and natives. To test this hypothesis we apply a bivariate probit 
model to data for 2006 from the Continuous Sample of Working Lives provided by the 
Spanish Social Security system, containing records for over a million workers. We find that 
risk exposure increases the probability of permanent disability – arising from any cause – by 
almost 5%. Temporary employment and low-skilled jobs also have a positive impact. 
Increases in education reduce the likelihood of disability, even after controlling for the impact 
of education on the choice of (lower) risk. Females have a greater probability of becoming 
disabled. Migrant status – with differences among regions of origin – significantly affects 
both disability and the probability of being employed in a high-risk occupation. In spite of 
immigrants’ working conditions being objectively worse, they exhibit a lower probability of 
becoming disabled than natives because the impact of such conditions on disability is much 
smaller in their case. Time elapsed since first enrolment in the Social Security system 
increases the probability of disability in a proportion similar to that of natives, which is 
consistent with the immigrant assimilation hypothesis. We finally conclude that our 
theoretical hypothesis that disability and risk are jointly determined is only valid for natives 
*Manuscript
Click here to view linked References
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 2 
and not valid for immigrants, in the sense that, for them, working conditions are not a matter 
of choice in terms of health.  
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Introduction 
 
Numerous investigations have demonstrated that working conditions, and in particular 
exposure to the risk of work-related injury and illness, have an impact on health (Llena-Nozal 
et al, 2004; Robone et al, 2010; Bartley et al, 2004; Benach et al, 2004; Monden, 2005, Berger 
and Leigh, 1989). Due to the increase of “flexible” employment and other forms of non-
standard contractual conditions, a growing body of literature has emerged that shows that 
unstable employment is associated with bad health too (Gash et al, 2007; Rodriguez, 2002; 
Virtanen et al, 2005). Also, psychological factors related to lack of autonomy at work and job 
dissatisfaction have appeared in several studies as strong determinants of general health or 
specific diseases (Datta Gupta and Kristensen, 2007; Marmot, 2004; Plaisier et al, 2007).  
 
As Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1997) stress, working conditions and the working environment 
affect both gradual changes in health and the occurrence of events that have a sudden impact 
on an individual’s health, like work-related accidents. These authors assume that health status 
and work history may be jointly determined (that is, they may be endogenous). The idea that 
individuals invest in their own health has had a prominent place in the health economics 
literature since the publication of Grossman’s seminal work in 1972, and the treatment of 
occupational choice as an investment in health can be found, for example, in Cropper (1977). 
 
Following this line of thought, our central notion is that the relationship between working 
conditions and health is mediated by occupational choice in terms of risk. It is plausible to 
assume that upon choosing a job – with its inherent level of risk – workers do not ignore the 
effects of working in a risky job on their health status. Nevertheless, the choice of work-
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related risk level is partially determined by preferences and partially determined by social and 
economic circumstances. Among such circumstances, migrant status is thought to strongly 
affect occupational choice.  
 
According to the hedonic equilibrium wage model, which relates wages to job characteristics 
including the relative attractiveness of a particular job, jobs with higher workplace risk 
receive a compensating wage premium. Nevertheless, wage-risk tradeoffs need not be equal. 
For instance, inequalities in lifetime levels of wealth – supposedly lower for immigrants – 
may explain differences in willingness to bear risk, i.e., immigrants or ethnic minorities 
would be more likely to accept and to be employed in high-risk jobs (Robinson, 1984; 
Viscusi, 2003; Leeth and Ruser, 2006). Immigrants and non-immigrants might also differ in 
terms of market opportunities. In several studies, it has been observed that the wages paid to 
compensate fatality risk differ among countries of origin, and that these variations may arise 
from discrimination, from unmeasured productivity differences (Akhavan, 2006; Leeth and 
Ruser, 2006) or from lower safety-related productivity arising from language barriers (Hersch 
and Viscusi 2010).  
 
The compensating wage premium represents, in fact, any type of compensation that labour 
markets offer that is different for immigrants and natives. In an economy with a large 
underground sector the compensation could be, for instance, a legal contract giving rise to 
legal resident status and Social Security benefits. Additionally, informational disadvantages or 
occupational crowding – high competition for the same job, exacerbated by high 
unemployment rates – probably force immigrants to choose higher levels of risk than those 
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arising from their preferences. From a health investment perspective, we can thus assume that 
there will be differences in health investments owing to migrant status. 
 
This research uses a dataset containing ample information about working lives and disability 
status to explore two sets of issues: Firstly, how do working and contractual conditions, and 
particularly exposure to health risks, contribute to the probability of acquiring a disability, 
taking into account the endogeneity of risk level choices? Secondly, are there socioeconomic 
inequalities between immigrants and natives in terms of risk choices and in terms of the effect 
of these choices on their health status? Moreover, are all immigrants the same?  
 
The existence of socioeconomic health inequalities due to differences in working conditions 
constitutes, in itself, a point of interest for public policies and they have been highlighted by 
several authors, for example, Artazcoz et al, 2005; Warren et al, 2004, Borg and Kristensen, 
2000; Power et al, 1998; Lundberg, 1991. Possible differences in market opportunities 
depending on migrants’ country of origin, resulting in higher risk exposure or more precarious 
employment constitute an additional source of inequality and are at the core of the debate on 
the conditions in which a society integrates new arrivals.  
 
Due to the recent dramatic growth in the immigrant population in Spain (in 2009, 13.8% of 
the population had been born abroad, whereas the percentage was only 3.13% in 1999), the 
above-mentioned issues stand out as a very important topic of public debate. However, 
evidence regarding health status and workplace conditions of immigrant populations in Spain 
and other developed countries is still scarce. Furthermore, the existing evidence is based on 
subjective perceptions of both working conditions and health status, or restricted to 
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differences in workplace illness and injury rates (Ahonen and Benavides, 2006; Parra et al, 
2006). We seek to contribute to the quality of the discussion by applying a behavioural model 
using objective measures of working conditions and disability status obtained from the Social 
Security census of working lives. Moreover, we focus on disability arising from any cause, 
not just injuries or professional illnesses. 
 
After this introduction, in the next section we discuss our conceptual and empirical 
frameworks. In section three we describe the institutional context and the data, and we present 
the variables and their descriptive statistics. Section four contains the results, and section five 
concludes with a discussion of the main results and some limitations.  
 
2. Methodological framework 
 
2.1. Conceptual framework 
 
We aim to model the two hypothesis that form the basis of our analysis: health depends on 
working and contractual conditions, mainly through the exposure to work-related health risks; 
and the occupational choice that determines the level of risk depends on preferences and 
opportunities in the labour market that may differ between immigrants and natives. 
 
Worker’s i health stock (Hi) is governed by a health production function where the health 
stock depreciates at rate , and L represents a stochastic and permanent shock (an example of 
a health production function with a stochastic shock can be found in Vaness, 2003): 
(1.1) 
(1.2) 
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iL  depends on 

Ri = the level of risk (injury and illness rate) associated with the job chosen, 

C  = other working conditions, 

Ai= the individual’s ability to work safely, and 

X i  = other 
individual variables shaping the acceptance of health risks. Permanent disability occurs when 
iH falls below a critical level. Transitions to permanent disability are observed, by definition, 
once in an individual’s lifetime. 
 
According to the arguments presented in the introduction, immigrants and natives face 
different levels of risk and, likely, the determinants of risk level choices have a differential 
incidence between these two groups: 
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where 1=immigrant and 2=native and the vector 

X i  covers all personal characteristics 
affecting the choice of risk level. 

R1i  and 

R2i , the risk level choices, are not only the result of 
individuals’ acceptance of risk but are also related to supply conditions, that is, the 
compensation (wage premium or other, if existing) offered in exchange of risk. The 
formulation presented in equation (2.1) and (2.2) is appropriate to empirically account for the 
sorting of workers into levels of risk underlying personal characteristics. 
 
2.2. Empirical framework 
 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
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The model consists of a recursive system of equations for disability and risk exposure, where 
the random component of the disability equation is allowed to be freely correlated with the 
random component of the risk equation. This specification is able to take endogeneity into 
account, which may arise from simultaneity and unobservable heterogeneity influencing both 
disability and risk exposure. Simultaneity (joint determination) issues may emerge from the 
fact that individuals do not ignore the health consequences of their risk level choices. This 
consideration is consistent with our conceptual framework, where risk choice is inserted into a 
health production function.  
 
To properly account for endogeneity, and considering that both disability and risk are 
dichotomous variables, we specify the following bivariate probit model (Greene, 1998): 
 
                                                    
01 *
1
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For individual 

i , *iD  and 
*
iR  are unobserved latent variables indicating the individual’s 
probability of acquiring a disability and the individual’s propensity for choosing a high-risk 
job respectively. We observe iD , a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the person moves 
to a permanent disability status and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the binary indicator iR  takes a 
value 1 if the individual is employed in a high-risk job and 0 otherwise. The vector 

X i  
contains the explanatory variables of disability. 

Z i is a vector of variables that influence 
current risk level choice but are uncorrelated with 

i; the remaining terms in equations (3.1) 
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 9 
and (3.2) are the unknown parameters of interest that we wish to estimate, 1 , 2 ,  and 

 , 
and the random error terms, 

i and 

i. The correlation between 

i and 

i -

 - will be 
estimated, too, assuming that it follows a bivariate normal distribution. 
 
The unobserved propensities *iD  and 
*
iR  will be estimated first for the whole sample, with 
immigrants’ region of origin as a dummy variable and interactions of these variables with 
risk. We then go on to estimate the bivariate probit separately for native-born Spaniards and 
immigrants, again distinguishing among immigrants’ regions of origin with a set of dummy 
variables. 
 
3. Institutional context, data and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1 Institutional context 
 
The employment-based Social Security (SS) system is mandatory for workers in Spain. 
Contributions are scaled according to occupational category. The SS funds the largest welfare 
programme: public benefits, allowances and pensions. Regarding permanent disability 
benefits, the law identifies four levels of disability, in increasing order of severity (the first 
two are compatible with employment): 1) partial-permanent disability for the usual 
profession, which refers to disability cases where a worker's ability to perform his/her usual 
tasks is decreased by 33% or more; 2) total permanent disability for the usual profession; 3) 
absolute permanent disability, which applies to cases were the individual is unable to 
undertake work of any kind; and 4) severe disability, where the person requires continued 
assistance from others in order to carry out basic daily activities (Jiménez-Martín et al, 2006). 
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To be eligible, the beneficiary must have contributed to the Social Security system for a 
minimum of five years if the disability is caused by an ordinary illness. There is no such 
requirement when the disability is caused by a work-related accident or a professional illness. 
 
3.2. Data and Variables 
 
We use the Continuous Sample of Working Lives, known as the MCVL in Spanish (from 
Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales), 2006, an administrative dataset provided by the 
Social Security administration with information on individuals who had an active record at 
any time during 2006. The sample is a 4% non-stratified random draw from a reference 
population that includes employed workers (wage earners and self-employed) and those on 
unemployment and other benefits. It consists of nearly 1.1 million individuals. The MCVL 
contains information on the employment and SS contribution history of the selected 
individuals dating back to 1967, although for reliability reasons we have limited the period to 
1980 onwards..   
 
Individual variables include sex, date and place of birth, family status, benefits, degree of 
disability and the year of its commencement. Corporate characteristics comprise the number 
of employees, foundation date and geographical location. Job characteristics cover type of 
contract, the firm’s sector of activity and the beginning and end dates of each contract. For 
each contractual relationship into which the worker enters, the characteristics of the job and 
the company are registered. 
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The MCVL has two features that are particularly relevant to our analysis: it contains a large 
and representative subsample of immigrants, and information regarding disabilities and the 
levels thereof. An immigrant is defined as someone who was born abroad. We work with 
cross section data: for active non-disabled population, the relationship with the Social 
Security prevailing in 2006 and, in the case of disabled people, data refer to the relationship 
applicable when the disability appeared. Since every contractual relation generates a new 
record, we can observe the actual working conditions prevailing when the disability occurred. 
From the original dataset, we have restricted our sample to working-age individuals (21 to 64 
years old) who have contributed to the SS system for at least five years, making a total of 
718,958 observations. A detailed description of the variables follows. 
 
Disability 
 
“Disability” takes the value 1 if the person moves to a permanent disability status (any of the 
four categories mentioned above) at any time of his/her active working life between 1980 and 
2006 and 0 otherwise. For disabled individuals, we consider the working conditions 
applicable at the time of the transition to disability, and subsequent working relations are 
discarded.  
 
Risk 
 
We have constructed the risk measure using narrowly defined injury and illness rates by 
industry-occupation: i.e., the number of individuals receiving an allowance for non-fatal 
work-related injuries or professional illness in a certain industry-occupation divided by the 
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total number of individuals working in that industry-occupation. There are 44 industries and 
10 occupations, which makes a total of 440 job-industry cells. The risk variable takes the 
value 1 if the individual’s job-industry cell is in the top quartile in the illness/injury rate 
ranking, and 0 otherwise. We find our binary variable to be more suitable than the continuous 
one. The latter would imply that individuals have full information of the level of risk 
throughout its whole distribution by industry-occupation cells. Taking into account that we 
are modelling a choice, it seems more reasonable to think that individuals broadly know about 
the existence of “good” and “bad” jobs in terms of risk. Indeed, below the upper quartile of 
the ranking, illness/injury rates are low and quite similar across industry-occupation cells.  
The interested reader can check Table 4 in the supplementary material where we present the 
non-fatal injury and illness rates aggregating by major industry-occupation cells. 
 
 
Explanatory variables   
 
In the disability equation we include both individual characteristics – age, sex, education, 
number of family members, and marital status – and working conditions: risk exposure, days 
since first enrolment in the Social Security system, type of contract, and a dummy variable for 
low-skilled jobs. The “type of contract” variable takes the value 1 for temporary and fixed-
term contracts, and 0 for the civil service and other kinds of open-ended employment. 
Following the classification of the Spanish Ministry of Labour, we consider “low-skilled” 
workers those employed in the subordinate and unskilled labourers occupations. This variable 
is used as a proxy for lack of autonomy on the job. Age is expected to have a positive effect 
on disability, while education is expected to have a negative one. It seems likely that the 
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greater the number of family members the more reluctant the worker will be to apply for 
disability benefits if that means losing income.  
 
A relevant variable in our analysis is education. One might expect the impact of education on 
the probability of disability to be reduced since some of its effect is mediated by the role of 
education in relation to risk: i.e. increases in education lessen the probability of accepting 
riskier jobs, which in turn, reduces the chance of disability (Warren et al, 2004). 
 
The risk equation contains mostly the same variables plus a dummy that takes the value 1 for 
workers whose previous working status was “unemployed”.  Crowded occupations or lack of 
employee bargaining power are natural correlates of unemployment status and constrain the 
worker’s range of opportunities in the job market. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that 
shifts from unemployment to high-risk jobs are more likely than transitions from other jobs to 
high-risk occupations, everything else being equal.  
 
Number of family members and marital status have been used in some studies as proxies for 
risk preferences (Leeth and Ruser, 2006; DeLeire and Levy, 2004). Size of the family and risk 
are expected to be negatively correlated. In the case of unmarried persons the expected sign is 
less clear but we tend to think that it is also negative because these individuals don’t need so 
much the (possible) wage compensation for risk and they cannot count so much on others to 
look after them in case of injury. Consistently with other literature which shows that women 
are more risk averse than men in their financial decisions (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998) 
and gambling (Hershey and Schoemaker, 1980), we expect women to engage in less risky 
jobs. 
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Control variables for corporate characteristics are also considered in the risk equation: number 
of employees and number of years since foundation. Findings from industrial safety literature 
indicate that firm size and accident rates are strongly correlated (Oi, 1974). The number of 
employees appears positively related to safety practices in Thomason (2002).  
 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 shows that the proportion of immigrants that have made the transition to a permanent 
disability (1.6%) is lower than that of natives (4.86%). Figure 1 (see supplementary material) 
depicts the non adjusted odd-ratios of disability associated with each of the three working and 
contractual conditions by country/region of origin. The odds-ratios are always higher for 
natives than for immigrants when these are taken altogether, but it is evident that the nature of 
the association varies widely among immigrants themselves.  
 
We also observe that on average, immigrants exhibit a higher educational attainment than 
natives. The percentages of immigrants with secondary (33.8%) or university (8.4%) studies 
are larger than those for natives (29.3% and 5.9%). The same result has also been found in 
Fernández and Ortega (2008) and Díaz-Serrano (2012).  
  
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
The proportion of immigrants on temporary contracts or low-skilled jobs is much higher than 
that of natives. Immigrants are also more likely to be employed in high-risk jobs. The 
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difference is not large (27.4% versus 26.8%), but it is statistically significant. However, 
disaggregation of immigrants by region/country of origin shows this general assertion to be 
over-simplistic. Only foreigners born in Africa and European non-EU15 countries are found 
in risky occupations in proportions higher than natives. Individuals born in Asia, the US, 
Canada, the EU15 and Latin America are actually less likely to engage in high-risk 
occupations. All groups, though (except EU15, USA and Canada), have more unstable 
contracts than natives. When the three potentially “unhealthy” working conditions are jointly 
considered, the proportion of immigrants employed in temporary, low-skilled or high-risk 
positions is nearly twice that of native-born Spaniards. This finding contradicts the expected 
positive relation between high academic attainment and good working conditions. 
 
As a summary, and as far as the comparison between immigrants and native-born Spaniards is 
concerned, three insights can be obtained from our preliminary analysis: immigrants are better 
educated, work in worse risk and contractual conditions which, in general, seem to be 
associated with higher disability rates, but are, in fact, less likely to become disabled. In the 
econometric analysis we will try to unscramble this apparent puzzle by controlling for all the 
determinants of occupational choice and disability and their differential effects. 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 2 summarises the estimation results using the full sample. The first four columns 
present the variables and estimated coefficients of the bivariate probit model . In order to 
assess the magnitude of the bias due to the endogeneity of risk choices, we also report the 
results of the univariate probit estimation of the probability of disability. These two models 
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include several regional dummies and their interactions with the risk variable. These 
interactions allow us to test for the potential existence of a differential effect of the level of 
risk on the probability of disability by birthplace. Selected results of the model in which 
immigrant status is captured by a single dummy variable are also included in two separate 
rows (model 3).  
 
In order to facilitate comparisons, we report the marginal effects instead of the estimated 
coefficients. For variables appearing in both the disability and the risk equations we report the 
total marginal effects. These are the sum of the direct effect of the variable (column 2) on the 
probability of disability plus the indirect effect. The indirect marginal effects capture the 
effect of the variable on the probability of disability coming through its impact on the 
probability of choosing a risky job. Marginal effects are computed based on Greene, 1998. 
 
It is interesting to note that the correlation (rho) between the unobservable factors affecting 
the probability of choosing a risky job and the probability of being disabled is negative and 
significant (-0.21). This result suggests that such unobservable factors tend to reduce the 
choice of risk but to increase the probability of being disabled, and vice versa. To formally 
test the null hypothesis of exogenous risk choice, we performed the Hausman-Wu test 
(Hausman, 1978). The exogeneity of risk choice was rejected (

p  0.05) in all models. 
Therefore, our comments are based on the estimates of the bivariate probit model. 
 
The impact of risk exposure on disability is strong and significant when the whole sample is 
considered. Workers employed in high-risk jobs increase their probability of becoming 
disabled by 4.7%. Moreover, all the marginal effects associated with working conditions are 
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significant and large. Being employed in a temporary job, as opposed to an open-ended 
contract, increases that probability by 2.2%. 
 
Education behaves as expected. The probability of disability decreases by 1.5% and 1.2% for 
college graduates and workers with secondary education respectively. Education is significant 
even after controlling for the effect of education on risk. . For instance, holding risk constant, 
having a university education reduces the chance of a disability by 1.32 percent; but education 
also reduces occupational risk so that the total impact of a university education on the chance 
of a disability allowing risk to vary is 1.50%.  The 17.9% lower likelihood of accepting a 
high-risk job (see the risk equation in table 2) reduces the chance of becoming disabled by 
0.18 percentage points, or 13.6 percent. We also estimated the bivariate probit model without 
education in the disability equation in order to observe changes in the risk coefficient. The 
results (not shown) indicate that the marginal effect of risk on disability would jump to 0.074, 
in contrast with the marginal effect of 0.047 that we obtain when education is included, as in 
Table 2. That is, education would pick up part of the effect of risk. 
  
 
INSERT TABLE 2  
 
The interactions of risk with the birthplace dummies are all negative, except for Asians and 
citizens from EU15, the US and Canada. Nevertheless, only the coefficient for non-EU15 
Europeans is significant, implying no differences with natives for the rest of groups. By 
contrast, regional dummies are all significant and negative except precisely for those born in 
non-EU15 Europe. These results suggest that differences in disability between natives and 
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immigrants are related to conditions associated with origin rather than being the result of a 
differential effect of risk by birthplace. Only for non-EU15 Europeans (Romanians, Poles, 
Ukrainians, etc.) differences in disability actually originate from a differential (lower) impact 
of risk on disability. 
 
When we do not distinguish by region of origin and estimate the bivariate model including a 
single variable for immigrants, the results show that being an immigrant reduces the 
probability of disability by nearly 0.9% (model 3), but the effect of this variable when 
interacted with risk is not significant. This reinforces the idea that differences in disability are 
more associated with region of origin itself than with a differential impact of risk by 
birthplace. 
 
The case of females is interesting. Holding risk constant, the direct marginal effect is to 
increase disability by 0.39 per cent, but since being a female actually reduces the acceptance 
of risk by 22.5%, the total marginal effect is just 0.16%. That is, the total probability of a 
female becoming disabled appears to be only slightly higher than that of men, but that is 
mainly due to   the indirect effect working through risk, which reduces that probability by 
0.23 percentage points, or 59 percent.  
 
Most of the other estimates in the univariate probit do not differ much from those of the 
bivariate one, except for risk. Given its endogenous nature, the effect of risk in the univariate 
model turns out to have a strong downward bias (marginal effects: 0.021 vs. 0.047). 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 19 
The estimates regarding the determinants of risk (lower part of Table 2) show that 
immigrants, taken as a whole, are more likely to be found in risky jobs (marginal effect equals 
0.0388 in model 3). However, there are differences by birthplace. Africans, Latin Americans 
and non-EU15 Europeans are the groups most prone to be engaged in risky jobs. People 
coming from China and other Asian countries are actually less likely to be exposed to work-
related risks than natives, and those born in the EU15, the US and Canada are not 
significantly different from natives.  
 
Table 3 allows for a more thorough analysis of disparities between natives and immigrants. 
First of all, we note that most of the estimated marginal effects in the disability equation are 
notably larger for natives than for immigrants, particularly so in the case of risk, age, 
university education and temporary contract. Moreover, female and primary education are not 
significant in the immigrants model. This suggests that in their case there are more 
unobserved factors that determine the probability of being disabled that we are not controlling 
for. 
 
The results for the regional dummies in the sample of immigrants indicate that differences 
among immigrants in terms of disability are not marked. Only Europeans from non-EU15 
countries have a greater probability of disability than the base category (Latin America) at 
10% significance, which is consistent with their significantly greater tendency to work in 
risky jobs (see the risk equation) and with the results of the univariate probit. The interaction 
of risk with the regional dummies shows that risk exposure has a differential (positive) impact 
on disability only for people born in Asia. Finally, it is noteworthy to mention that again the 
univariate probit tends to underestimate the effect of risk on disability. This result holds for 
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both natives and immigrants, even though for immigrants rho is not statistically different from 
zero. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Generally, the variables included in the risk equation are highly significant and have the 
expected sign for both sociodemographic groups, with less difference between them in the 
size of the marginal effects than in the disability equation. Yet there are some peculiarities 
that deserve attention. The effect of age in the case of natives corresponds to a U-shape 
(negative and increasing), while the effect of years since first enrolment in the Social Security 
system follows an inverted U-shape (positive and decreasing), just the opposite to the pattern 
of immigrants. This implies that older immigrants are willing to accept more risk, although at 
a decreasing rate, whereas the longer immigrants stay in the legal labour market, the less risk 
they are willing to undertake. The negative effect of being unmarried is not significant for 
immigrants and the number of family members has a positive effect on risk in their case, 
while the reverse is true for natives.  Finally, as anticipated, the transit from unemployment to 
high-risk work is more likely than the transit from a safer job to a high-risk one for both 
groups, the size of the effect being greater for immigrants. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Our study constitutes an effort to assess disparities between immigrants and natives in the role 
played by working and contractual conditions, particularly risk exposure, in determining the 
occurrence of disability, an indication of poor health. Our paper differs from previous studies 
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in one or several of the following ways. First, we focus on disability arising from any cause, 
and not just from injuries and professional illness. Secondly, our indicator of health is based 
on an objective measure, rather than the commonly used scales of self-perceived health. 
Thirdly, we analyse differences by region of origin in order to avoid inappropriate 
generalisations to all immigrants. Lastly, but most importantly, we account for possible 
endogeneity of risk exposure on the disability equation. We aim to capture the determinants 
of the occupational choice so as to better understand the factors behind discrepancies in health 
outcomes.  
 
We explicitly determine that working conditions have an impact on health for natives and 
immigrants. Risk exposure is, as expected, a decisive factor in accounting for differences in 
disability. The considerable magnitude of its effect is one of our most important results. The 
findings regarding the strong impact of temporary employment on disability are also 
noteworthy and deserve further comment. The experience of job insecurity has already been 
associated with ill health in studies such as Robone et al, 2010 and Rodríguez, 2002. 
Nevertheless, previous evidence of this association for Spain is scarce and somewhat 
ambiguous (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2002). The present study shows that the negative effect of 
temporary employment on health is unambiguous when its impact is measured using an 
overall health status indicator, such as permanent disability, rather than considering only work 
related injuries and illness rates.  
 
As to disparities between immigrants and natives, we find, first of all, that the probability of 
becoming disabled is higher for natives. We must also conclude that our theoretical 
hypothesis that disability and risk are jointly determined is only valid for natives and not valid 
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for immigrants. Such is the interpretation of the non-significance of the rho parameter in the 
model for immigrants in Table 3. This is consistent with earlier studies that confirm the weak 
role played by risk in occupational choices in the case of immigrants (Díaz-Serrano, 2012). 
 
Our results are in agreement with previous studies of the immigrant assimilation hypothesis in 
Spain (Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica, 2007), as time elapsed since first enrolment in the 
Social Security system increases the probability of disability similarly to natives. The transit 
from unemployment increases the probability that risks will be accepted slightly more in the 
case of immigrants. These findings can be interpreted as a confirmation that immigrants (at 
least, some of them) are affected more than natives by lack of opportunities in the labour 
market. In addition, the significance of most of the regions of origin in the risk equation 
suggests a heterogeneous pattern of occupational choice among the various communities of 
immigrants.  
 
A principal corollary is that an effective and equitable health policy should incorporate a full 
understanding of the role of working conditions on determining health disparities. 
Furthermore, a better knowledge of the conditions in which vulnerable groups – like 
immigrants – access safe working conditions may help avoid future health inequalities. The 
strong effect on disability of risk exposure and other forms of precarious employment – such 
as temporary jobs – suggests that the actions involved in these policies probably need to go 
beyond traditional occupational health policies.  
 
One important limitation of our analysis is the lack of the individual’s baseline health in our 
data. This variable is expected to have an influence on both the likelihood of accepting risks 
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and the advent of disability. Its omission might bias the marginal effect of the other variables. 
For example, a better initial health status could explain the smaller impact of working 
conditions on disability in the case of immigrants, in spite of their working conditions being 
objectively worse than those of natives. This interpretation is consistent with other studies 
indicating that healthy people are the more likely ones to migrate; the so-called “healthy 
migrant effect” (Esteban-Vasallo, 2009; Akhavan, 2006; Swerdlow, 1991). Nevertheless, the 
fact that we account for some of the determinants of health (age, gender, education) may 
mitigate the size of the bias. We also do not know what  were the economic circumstances in 
the home country, which could affect the willingness to accept risk. 
 
Another limitation is that our data include only insured workers. This excludes irregular 
labour practices, which are more likely to occur among foreign workers. Also, institutional 
and bureaucratic requirements to obtain a disability pension may affect natives and 
immigrants differently. The latter may be less likely to apply for disability benefits due to lack 
of information or specific capabilities. Nevertheless, all individuals in our sample – including 
immigrants – had been working and living in Spain for at least five years, a factor that 
probably lessens the differences. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics       
       
IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY/REGION OF 
ORIGIN 
   TOTAL 
NATIVE-
BORN 
SPANIARDS  
IMMIGRANTS 
(ALL) 
TEST OF 
INDEPENDENCE AFRICA 
LATIN 
AMERICA 
EUROPE 
NON-EU 
15 
EU-15
&
, 
USA 
AND 
CANADA ASIA 
VARIABLE % % % 
2
/t % % % % % 
N    718,958 681,078 37,880   8,632 12,830 3,281 10,744 2,393 
%    100 94.73 5.27   1.20 1.78 0.46 1.49 0.33 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES                   
  Disability 4.69 4.86 1.60 29.20** 1.90 1.02 1.00 2.34 1.10 
  Risk 26.87 26.84 27.36 4.61** 39.52 24.66 36.18 21.30 13.04 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS                   
  Age (mean) 41.68 41.78 39.83 6.29** 39.92 40.21 37.62 39.81 40.49 
  Gender: Female 41.50 41.58 39.95 33.65** 21.17 49.66 40.11 44.91 33.14 
  Education                   
   Without studies 26.79 26.76 27.57 10.65** 58.29 17.66 22.73 17.42 39.44 
   Primary 37.75 38.06 30.32   22.59 31.58 33.96 34.89 29.11 
   Secondary 29.51 29.33 33.75   15.59 40.21 35.35 37.64 25.52 
   University 5.95 5.85 8.37   3.53 10.55 7.96 10.06 5.93 
  Family members (mean) 3.16 3.14 3.59 58.45** 4.01 3.74 3.46 2.96 4.32 
  Unmarried 12.95 12.81 15.52 15.24** 16.93 12.52 14.17 18.17 16.21 
WORKING CONDITIONS                   
   Temporary contract 37.88 37.31 47.73 33.36** 61.14 48.57 43.42 37.81 40.20 
   Self-employed 16.29 16.31 16.04 1.38 9.97 13.05 13.01 21.06 35.60 
   Low-skilled job 28.51 28.14 35.19 29.62** 53.71 35.14 33.98 22.65 26.79 
  Years since 1st enrolment in the SS system 16.88 20.65 12.31 157.56** 12.32 10.71 9.66 15.18 11.25 
  Previous working status: unemployed 17.04 17.15 14.89 11.44** 16.62 13.86 14.69 16.58 6.81 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS$                   
   Nr. Employees (mean) 314.56 320.9 236.86 1.36 196.08 310.07 193.10 228.77 94.11 
    Years since foundation (mean) 17.53 17.68 14.75 30.02** 14.02 15.09 13.92 15.76 11.73 
&  The EU-15 includes the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. Here and throughout the text, reference to EU15 means all previous countries except Spain. 
 
$
 Only includes private sector          
** Indicates that the means are significantly different            
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 Table 2. Bivariate probit and univariate probit estimations for the whole sample. Immigrants 
represented with dummmies by region of origin or taken as a whole (model 3). Marginal 
effects. 
 
 
   Model 1. Bivariate Probit Model 2. Univariate Probit 
 
    Total Mg.  
Effects 
Mg. Effects 
(direct effect) 
  z   
Mg. 
Effects 
  z   
 Dependent Variable: Permanent disability        
 Age 0.0019 0.0019 84.67 ** 0.0018 81.9 ** 
 Female 0.0016 0.0039 4.07 ** -0.0027 -8.03 ** 
 Primary education
$
 -0.0055 -0.0046 -16.02 ** -0.0062 -18.84 ** 
 Secondary education
$
 -0.0122 -0.0097 -28.24 ** -0.0139 -36.24 ** 
 University education
$
 -0.0150 -0.0132 -22.38 ** -0.0158 -26.28 ** 
 Unmarried 0.0024 0.0023 4.18 ** 0.0022 3.78 ** 
 Family members -0.0020 -0.0018 -13.96 ** -0.0020 -14.77 ** 
 Years since 1
st
 enrolment in SS 0.0019 0.0016 19.85 ** 0.0018 19.53 ** 
 
Years since 1
st
 enrolment in SS 
Sq 0.0000 0.0000 -16.31 
** 
0.0000 -15.32 ** 
 Temporary contract 0.0219  63.58 ** 0.0197 59.29 ** 
 Low skilled job 0.0097  24.98 ** 0.0104 27.91 ** 
 Risk  0.0470  39.27 ** 0.0209 49.28 ** 
 Risk*African -0.0044  -1.32   -0.0039 -1.23   
 Risk*Latin American -0.0056  -1.45   -0.0071 -2.02 ** 
 Risk* Europe non-EU15  -0.0131  -2.54 ** -0.0129 -2.58 ** 
 Risk* EU15, USA, Canada 0.0019  0.56   0.0013 0.42   
 Risk*Asia 0.0167  1.33   0.0090 0.83   
 Africa -0.0097 -0.0092 -5.03 ** -0.0096 -5.24 ** 
 Latin America -0.0104 -0.0099 -5.67 ** -0.0102 -5.8 ** 
 Europe non-EU15 -0.0036 -0.0050 -0.86   -0.0032 -0.79   
 EU15, USA, Canada -0.0042 -0.0039 -2.47 ** -0.0045 -2.79 ** 
 Asia -0.0134 -0.0121 -3.97 ** -0.0133 -4.3 ** 
MODEL 3 Immigrant -0.0088  -8.74 ** -0.0081 -8.31 ** 
  Risk*Immigrant -0.0021   -1.12   -0.0037 -2.13 ** 
 Dependent Variable: Risk
   
       
 Age  -0.0150  -27.71 **     
 Age squared  0.0001  22.11 **     
 
Female  
-0.2251 
 -
208.5
6 
** 
    
 Primary education
$
 -0.0417  -34.06 **     
 
Secondary education
$
 
-0.1661  
-
130.0
9 
** 
    
 
University education
$
 
-0.1794  
-
101.2
6 
** 
    
 Unmarried  -0.0093  -5.06 **     
 Family members  -0.0013  -3.14 **     
 Years since 1
st
 enrolment in SS 0.0104  26.78 **     
 
Years since 1
st
 enrolment in SS 
Sq -0.0001 
 
-14.34 
** 
    
 Unemployed last relation 0.0370  25.06 **     
 Africa  0.0596  11.91 **     
 Latin America  0.0656  13.54 **     
 Europe non-EU15  0.1659  18.83 **     
 EU15, USA, Canada  0.0066  1.51       
 Asia  -0.0885  -9.61 **     
 
Years since firm´s foundation 
0.0000 
 -
206.7
9 **     
 Nr. of employees   0.0000   -42.76 **       
MODEL 3 Immigrant   0.0388   14.68 **       
 Rho  -0.21       No. Observations 648547 
 Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0:    chi2(1) =  352.90    Log pseudolikelihood = -94180.80 
 No. Observations  629700    Wald chi2(12) =26657,85 
 Log pseudolikelihood  -363972.67    Prob > chi2 0.0000  
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 Prob > chi2   0.0000       Pseudo R2 0.1835   
 ** Significant at 5% level ;  * Significant at 10% level     
 $ Excluded category: no studies     
 
The marginal effects of the binary variables are calculated as the difference in the average predicted probability of a 
positive outcome for the variable when:(1) variable values are set to zero; and (2) variable values are set to one 
  z-statistics refer to the estimated coefficients 
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Table 3. Bivariate probit and univariate probit for native-born Spaniards and for immigrants (Marginal Effects)     
                         
 
Native-born Spaniards 
Immigrants, with regional dummies and 
interactions 
          
       
Bivariate Probit 
    
 
Univariate Probit 
 
 
Bivariate Probit 
    
 
Univariate Probit 
 
 
          
Dependent Variable: Permanent disability                   
 
Total Mg.  
Effects 
Mg. 
Effects 
(direct 
effect) 
  z   
Total Mg.  
Effects 
  z   
Total Mg.  
Effects 
Mg. 
Effects 
(direct 
effect) 
  z   
Total Mg.  
Effects 
  z 
  
          
Age   0.0021 0.0021 85.22 ** 0.0019 82.72 ** 0.0005 0.0004 9.43 ** 0.0005 9.23 **           
Female   0.0016 0.0040 3.86 ** -0.0031 -8.55 ** -0.0004 0.0010 -0.45  -0.0008 -0.99            
Primary education
$
 
 -0.0058 -0.0049 
-
15.84 
** 
-0.0065 
-
18.77 ** -0.0011 -0.0009 -1.17  -0.0012 -1.26  
          
Secondary education
$
 
 -0.0127 -0.0101 
-
27.74 
** 
-0.0147 
-
35.85 ** -0.0047 -0.0036 -4.48 ** -0.0045 -4.64 ** 
          
University education
$
 
 -0.0161 -0.0142 
-
22.37 
** 
-0.0169 
-
26.31 ** -0.0035 -0.0026 -2.46 ** -0.0034 -2.57 ** 
          
Unmarried   0.0031 0.0030 5.06 ** 0.0028 4.78 * -0.0033 -0.0029 -2.94 ** -0.0032 -3.01 **           
Family members   -0.0019 -0.0018 
-
12.72 
** 
-0.0020 
-
13.39 ** -0.0014 -0.0013 -4.99 ** -0.0013 -4.92 ** 
          
Years since 1st 
enrolment in SS   0.0017 0.0014 16.87 
** 
0.0016 16.25 ** 0.0017 0.0016 8.67 ** 0.0016 8.39 ** 
          
Years since 1st  enrolment in 
SS Sq.  0.0000 0.0000 
-
14.02 
** 
0.0000 
-
12.82 ** 0.0000 0.0000 -5.25 ** 0.0000 -4.88 ** 
          
Temporary contract   0.0233  63.58 ** 0.0209 59.14 ** 0.0050  5.89 ** 0.0046 5.76 **           
Low-skilled job   0.0101  24.65 ** 0.0109 27.69 ** 0.0049  4.76 ** 0.0046 4.84 **           
Risk   0.0502  39.64 ** 0.0219 49.2 ** 0.0080  2.41 ** 0.0050 2.36 **           
Risk*African            0.0015  0.59  0.0022 0.87            
Risk* European             -0.0032  -1.11  -0.0028 -0.97            
Risk* EU15, USA, 
Canada     
 
 
     
0.0014  0.59  0.0021 0.85  
          
Risk*Asia            0.0132  1.87 * 0.0113 1.74 *           
Africa
&
            0.0003 0.0002 0.24  0.0004 0.28            
Europe non-EU15
&
            0.0050 0.0036 1.93 * 0.0048 1.94 *           
EU15, USA, Canada
&
            0.0020 0.0018 1.53  0.0020 1.64            
Asia
&
                   -0.0022 -0.0015 -1.05   -0.0018 -0.9            
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Table 3. Continued                 
Dependent Variable: Risk  
  
    
Native-born 
Spaniards 
  
Immigrants 
 
    
Total Mg.  
Effects 
   z       
Total Mg.  
Effects 
   z 
        
Age   -0.0204  -33.36 **   0.0102  5.4 **    
Age squared   0.0001  27.98 **   -0.0001  -5.87 **    
Female   -0.2223  -200.26 **   -0.2316  -52.41 **    
Primary education   -0.0424  -33.69 **   -0.0188  -3.63 **    
Secondary education   -0.1661  -125.28 **   -0.1071  -20.5 **    
University education   -0.1798  -96.92 **   -0.1363  -20.4 **    
Unmarried   -0.0108  33.38 **   -0.0066  -0.96     
Family members   -0.0025  -21.63 **   0.0053  4.4 **    
Years since 1st 
enrolment in SS   0.0148  -5.7 
**   
-0.0103  -8.58 **    
Years since 1st enrolment 
in SS Sq.  -0.0002 
 
-5.58 
**   
0.0003  8.53 **    
Unemployed last 
relation   0.0363 
 
23.98 
**   
0.0406  6.46 **    
Years since firm´s 
foundation   0.0000 
 
-202.27 
**   
0.0000  -36.54 **    
Nr. of employees   0.0000  -42.07 **   0.0000  -7.23 **    
Africa          0.0116  1.94 *    
Europe non-EU15          0.0799  9.6 **    
EU15, USA, Canada          -0.0019  -0.34     
Asia                 -0.1072   -12.98 **       
Rho     -0.21    No. Observations 614452  Rho 
 
 -0.05  No. Observations 33595 
Likelihood-ratio test of rho=0:  
chi2(1) = 370.70 
   
Log 
pseudolikelihood -91862.33 
Likelihood-ratio test 
of rho=0: chi2(1) = 0.77 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -2235.62 
No. Observations   598299    Wald chi2(12) 26657.85 No. Observations 31401 Wald chi2(20) 626.27 
Log pseudolikelihood   -348258.77    Prob > chi2 0.0000 Log -15111.97 Prob > chi2 0.0000 
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pseudolikelihood  
Prob > chi2     0.0000 
      
 Pseudo R2  0.1835 Prob > chi2 0.0000 Pseudo R2 
  
 0.1578 
** Significant at 5% level             
* Significant at 10% level                
$ Excluded category: no studies             
&Excluded category: Latin America               
Marginal effects calculated as in Table 2  
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